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Why Does Global Health Matter?
The Health of the World Knows No Borders 
By working with others to prepare for a potential pandemic like avian 
influenza, we are safeguarding the health of people around the world and in 
turn protecting the health of those in the United States.2
There is a danger that all this new energy for global health will result in it 
becoming an activity developed through the lens of rich countries, ostensibly 
for the benefit of poor countries, but without the key ingredients of a 
mutually agreed, collaborative endeavor.3
Global health is a recent term, barely more than a decade old, used to express the 
way that human health relates to processes of transnationalism and globalization. The 
framing of the concept global health represents an attempt to create distance between 
the colonial discourse of tropical medicine and hygiene, and contemporary globalized 
practices of health education, care, and intervention. Global health is also differentiated 
from international health, a mid-twentieth-century term that placed the insights of 
tropical medicine within the conceptual, policy, and regulatory context of international
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development and also incorporated perspectives from public health.4 Global health, as 
measured by initiatives, programs, and statements made in its name, is an 
overwhelmingly North American initiative, but it has also been taken up by 
multilateral institutions, like the World Health Organization (WHO), that receive large 
amounts of support from the United States and Canada. While the concept of global 
health is set firmly against health disparities, it is also encompassed by an interest in 
protecting "society" against threats, like AIDS and tuberculosis, that don't respect 
national borders but seem to emanate from, and are most pernicious in, the 
"developing" world. In its concern for security and border-crossing disease that 
threatens the health of individual, primarily "First-World," nations, it sustains 
hierarchies held over from the previous rubrics of tropical medicine and international 
health noted above.5
At the turn of the twenty-first century, precisely as the global health concept was 
coming into being, a new strain of type A influenza virus, named H5N1 for its five 
Hemagglutinin and one Neuraminidase receptors, appeared in Asia. H5N1 was one of 
the first (along with SARS, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), and easily the most 
extensive and enduring, emerging diseases to be approached as a matter for global 
health. Framing the disease as a problem relevant to global health meant that the H5N1 
intervention combined a concern for healthcare disparities with concerns for cross- 
border security, and these contradictory goals frequently came into conflict. In this 
article, I will be concerned with how the international effort to stop the spread of H5N1 
was carried out in Indonesia. Through the transforming and transformative 
rationalities of the global health paradigm, Indonesia was made ready to confront an 
emerging disease that appeared to threaten both its domestic population and 
international security.
H5N1 as a Problem for Global Health
In 2003, poultry began dying in Indonesia of the H5N1 influenza virus, and the 
Indonesian Department of Agriculture covered it up. The outbreak started in 
commercial poultry production facilities, spread to backyard poultry, and ultimately 
affected humans, but pressure from poultry industry representatives on politicians 
dampened the national response.6 It took six months after the first poultry outbreaks 
for Indonesia to acknowledge the disease had struck in the country, and two years, up 
to the time when the first human deaths occurred, for the country to develop a 
comprehensive response to the disease. This meant that, initially, appropriate culling 
measures were not followed, the global health community was not involved in testing 
or responding to the outbreak, and the international community accused Indonesia of 
putting the world's health at risk.7 It was the heroic action on the part of a handful of
4 Ibid., pp. 384-85.
5 Ibid., pp. 389.
6 Allan Sipress, "On the Front Lines of Asian Battle Against Bird Flu," Washington Post, May 22, 2005, p. 
At.
7 Allan Sipress, "UN Urging Indonesia to Take Stronger Action Against Bird Flu," Washington Post, 
October 23, 2005; and Richard Flolbrooke and Laurie Garrett, "'Sovereignty' that Risks Global Health," 
Washington Post, August 10, 2008, p. A19.
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scientists—Indonesia's former Director of Animal Health, Dr. Tri Satya Putri 
Naipospos, who first spoke to the press, and professor of microbiology Dr. Chairul 
Nidom, who first detected the virus in Indonesian chickens and made his findings 
public—that brought the outbreak into the open and forced Indonesia to respond.8
It might have been predicted that this highly pathogenic, emerging disease was on 
its way across the South China Sea to Indonesia. H5N1, an avian influenza, is a 
relatively new disease in humans, as it jumped the species barrier from poultry to 
humans only in the mid-1990s, when an outbreak struck Hong Kong, killing first a 
three-year-old boy and then more than a dozen others. The Hong Kong outbreak was 
broken by a massive poultry cull and a blockade on imports from Guangdong, 
mainland China, the apparent source of the virus. But in 2003, poultry outbreaks of the 
disease began appearing across Asia—first in Korea, Thailand, then Vietnam—with 
rarer human cases following close behind. Once these cases were acknowledged, it 
quickly became clear to observers like Ambassador John Lange, US Special 
Representative on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, that Indonesia had the most human 
cases and was the likely site, "ground zero" in his words, for a deadly global pandemic 
outbreak.9 Should the virus mutate and gain the transmissibility of the seasonal flu, the 
consequences would be devastating.10
In the middle part of the '00 decade, the H5N1 Influenza virus was understood by 
the international community to be an imminent worldwide global health threat. While 
the disease proceeded to tear through poultry flocks, making its way west from 
Southeast Asia to Africa and Europe, becoming the worst avian pandemic in known 
history, human cases were limited but also deeply troubling. For one thing, the human 
mortality rate could be as high as 80 percent in some instances, and the disease was 
virtually untreatable. When infected with H5N1, the human body seems to dissolve 
from the inside out, as lungs fill with fluid and the patient slowly drowns. Preparations 
for such a pandemic, and the desire to stop it before it materialized, initiated a massive 
international response, one that eclipsed other scientific, healthcare, and aid agendas, 
and whose budget rapidly outstripped funding available for ongoing medical, 
scientific, and development efforts.
The spread of H5N1 conjured specters of the largely forgotten 1918 influenza 
pandemic, which killed, on average, only 4 percent of those individuals who were 
infected if they had previous exposure to the influenza virus and a functioning 
immune system.11 Even then, the 1918 event caused more deaths globally than the total 
casualties, civilian and military, of World War I, while in Indonesia alone the virus is
8 Allan Sipress, "Indonesia Neglected Bird Flu Until Too Late, Experts Say" Washington Post, October 20, 
2005, p. Al.
9 John Lange, "Avian and Pandemic Influenza: The US International Strategy" The State Department at 
Work, ejournal USA, February 2007, no longer online.
10 Influenza viruses are rapidly mutating RNA viruses, and this ability to mutate increases the potential for 
a pandemic strain of influenza virus to evolve. There are two main ways that this could occur. The first is 
through "reassortment," which could happen if a single host were co-infected with FI5N1 and a highly 
transmissible virus at the same time. The second is through "mutation," the evolution of a single virus into 
a more transmissible form.
11 John M. Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History (New York, NY: 
Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 360-65.
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likely to have caused a million and a half deaths.12 The 1918 pandemic killed more 
young, healthy adults aged fifteen to thirty-four than it did children or elderly persons, 
suggesting to researchers that death resulted from the overreaction of a healthy adult 
immune system, or a "cytokine storm." In 2005, researchers reconstructed the genome 
of the 1918 strain, an H1N1 virus, from human remains buried in the Arctic 
permafrost, demonstrating that the 1918 flu had been an avian virus that had adapted 
itself to humans.13
International organizations, such as the WHO, the World Organisation for Animal 
Health (still referred to as the OIE, formerly Office International des Epizooties), the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), along with US institutions like the Center 
for Disease Control (CDC) and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), put pandemic preparedness squarely in the center of their 
programs. Affected countries were expected to work closely with these institutions to 
prevent a worldwide health catastrophe. The organizations developed scenarios 
outlining their potential responses to outbreaks, demonstrating that they planned to 
intervene through disease surveillance, biosecurity education, sample identification, 
and vaccine preparation, among other ways. Here, in the ideal scenario of just one of 
these organizations, the WHO, is an example of how things were supposed to work 
when assistance is extended to an affected country:
In January 2004, WHO officials were understandably on high alert for any signs 
that H5N1 might again cross the species barrier to cause disease in humans. On 5 
January, Vietnamese health authorities informed the WHO office in Hanoi of an 
unusual cluster of severe respiratory disease in 11 previously healthy children 
hospitalized in Hanoi. Of these patients, 7 had died and 2 were in critical 
condition. Treatment with antibiotics produced no response, and a viral cause 
was suspected. Infection with the SARS virus was considered but did not seem 
likely. For unknown reasons, SARS tended to spare children, rarely causing 
severe illness, and was never considered a pediatric disease. WHO was asked to 
assist in the Hanoi investigation, and arrangements were made for testing of 
patient specimens at WHO reference laboratories.14
The key elements of this scenario were: a biological event (H5N1 jumped the species 
barrier and infected humans); case identification (engaging existing hospital-level 
surveillance mechanisms to evaluate an illness with symptoms resembling those of 
influenza); notification of international authorities (the WHO); and technical 
intervention by the global health community (specimens tested at WHO reference 
labs). Intervention was meant to analyze and evaluate the disease and its trajectory as 
it related to an entire population, and was not intended to function on behalf of those 
individuals afflicted. When Indonesia initially failed to report its cases, this system
12 Collin Brown, "The Influenza Pandemic of 1918 in Indonesia," in Death and Disease in Southeast Asia: 
Explorations in Social, Medical, and Demographic Eliston/, ed. Norman Owen (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), pp. 235-56.
13 Jeffrey Toubenberger et al., "Characterization of the 1918 Influenza Virus Polymerase Genes," Nature 437 
(October 6, 2005): 889-93.
14 World Health Organization, Avian Influenza: Assessing the Pandemic Threat (WHO: Global Influenza 
Program Publication, 2005).
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could not work, and Indonesia's status as an "attentive," "capable," and "prepared" 
nation was called into question.
H5N1 as Event and Problem Domain
Rather than accepting at face value Indonesia's apparent failures and the situation 
as I have outlined it from the perspective of the international global health 
community—as a sign of the country's irrationality, lack of capacity, or 
underdevelopment—I examine the emergence of H5N1 avian influenza by considering 
it as a "problematization." A problematization, as defined by Foucault, is characterized 
by an occurrence—in this case, H5N1 jumping the species barrier to become a fatal 
human disease—that creates uncertainty and induces changes in our ways of 
understanding, acting, and relating. The importance of looking at social change in this 
way is that it activates the potentialities of a given situation. Different perspectives and 
solutions potentially exist—we are not dealing with an outcome predicated on known 
historical or structural constraints—and yet the scope of what is true and what is false 
is not unlimited.15 In combination, the massive international intervention in Indonesia, 
and questions over Indonesia's response to the disease, indicate a problem domain 
amenable to thought, which requires intervention, and may potentially induce change.
From almost any perspective, the status of Indonesia as a country capable of 
responding effectively to the outbreak was at stake. Moreover, the force of the global 
health response was massive, and any institution connected to the issue of H5N1 
needed to contend with the tsunami of funding and focused attention devoted to the 
problem. This problematic situation, then, had two overarching aspects, each focused 
on a question: 1) was Indonesia sufficiently attentive to and prepared for the present 
outbreak and for a potential pandemic?; and 2) how would Indonesian government 
and private-sector institutions deal with the overwhelming attention and funding 
directed toward influenza? Answers to these questions, as I have indicated, are not 
objects but processes. Moreover, they occurred within a field of intervention—a space 
constituted by vital matter, discourse, politics where a series of events unfold—that 
Foucault has called a milieu.16 A milieu is both a natural and social medium, a set of 
overall constraints and effects that bear upon the problematic situation. In the case of 
the H5N1 outbreak in Indonesia, the contemporary milieu consisted of the paradigms 
of global health and security, as well as Indonesian concerns for sovereignty and 
scientific and economic development.
Foucault's concept of milieu, outlined in Security, Territory, Population, is set within 
his own wider exploration of the problems of security, and the relationship of security 
to population. The problem space of security, within this discussion, responds to the 
question: "what must be done to meet something that is not exactly known in 
advance?"17 Andrew Lakoff and Stephen Collier interpret global health as a problem
15 See Paul Rabinow, "Midst Anthropology's Problems," Cultural Anthropology 17,2 (2002):135-49. For 
Foucault, it is important that this type of analysis produces "diagnosis" rather than a direct move to 
intervention or repair. See Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (New York, NY:
Palgrave/MacMillan, 2007), pp. 3-4.
16 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, pp. 21-22.
17 Ibid., p. 19.
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space of security, and identify a moment in time and a set of actions that resulted in 
problems of disease being framed within a new normative rationality: preparedness 
rather than prevention, or, more specifically, biosecurity rather than public health. The 
field of biosecurity engages new practices and knowledge formations designed to 
understand and manage both disease and security in novel ways. Biosecurity, as a 
project or field, is a response to such challenges as weakened public health systems, the 
"return of the microbe" in the form of new frightening diseases like SARS and West 
Nile virus, not to mention the ongoing AIDS epidemic. It also responds to such events 
as the bombing of the World Trade Center on September 11, and the posting of letters 
containing deadly anthrax bacteria in the United States in 2001. Following each of these 
events, the public's overall sense of being under threat and needing to take preventive 
action increased, although Lakoff and Collier make it clear that this change in the 
normative understanding of threat has post-WWII roots much older than the 
contemporary events composed and carried out as acts of terror.
Biosecurity operates within the context of three mechanisms of power Foucault has 
described at length: sovereignty, or the juridical mechanism; surveillance, or the 
disciplinary mechanism; and optimization, or the mechanism of security. This last, the 
mechanism (or apparatus) of security is especially operative in pandemic 
preparedness, since the concept of preparing for something not known in advance, but 
whose parameters are modeled by those seeking to develop contingency plans, is 
characteristic of modern epidemic management. Further, optimization, as a form of 
biopower (control over the vital aspects of populations), takes the biological or species 
characteristics of a phenomenon (like disease) into account, and attempts to set such a 
phenomenon within a series of probable events that can then be compensated for. The 
apparatus of security both calculates cost (is instrumental) and sets a phenomenon 
within a range of acceptability (is optimal).
Foucault makes it clear that these mechanisms are not historically progressive. 
Rather,
In reality you have a series of complex edifices in which, of course, the techniques 
themselves change and are perfected, or anyway become more complicated, but 
in which what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, 
the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary 
mechanisms, and mechanisms of security.18
If we consider H5N1 avian influenza and its emergence in Indonesia as an event and a 
problem domain operating within a milieu, what becomes noteworthy is how this 
system of correlation differs among institutions and agents that are pulled into the 
problematization. What is clear from the start is that an outbreak of avian influenza, as 
an event, is neither a singular phenomenon nor simply defined by one's perspective 
and therefore dependant upon one's identity as, let's say, either an Indonesian or an 
American.
A brief example is illustrative. When the Indonesian government was challenged to 
outline its anticipated response to the epidemic and explain how it would 
accommodate the flows of incoming funds, it answered by establishing the Indonesian
18 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 8.
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National Committee on Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (Komnas FBPI, Komite Nasional Pengendalian Flu Burung dan 
Kesiapsiagaan Menghadapi Pendemi Influenza). Komnas FBPI was funded by the 
government of Indonesia, USAID, UNICEF, CIDA (Canadian International 
Development Agency), JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), and the World 
Bank, and one of its first actions was to develop Indonesia's "National Strategic Plan 
for Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Preparedness," a response to the 
international mandate that every country have "a preparedness plan."19 Operating in 
the domain of sovereignty the committee established the importance of avian influenza 
on par with Human Rights and the Rights of the Child, issues also represented by 
Indonesian "national committees." Operating in the domain of discipline—the sphere of 
surveillance, correction, and individuation—the state functioned both as a kind of 
"self," subjected to surveillance by the global health community and urged to improve, 
and, also, as a force of correction, as it informed the Indonesian public about ways to 
prevent human and animal outbreaks. Finally, operating in the domain of optimization, 
the national strategic plan acknowledged the nature of the virus's constantly mutating 
genome by focusing on strategies that would help identify outbreaks of this protean 
virus in poultry markets and in wild bird populations—i.e., surveillance.
In the international community, preparedness had become an ethical attribute as 
well as a technology of rule. The seriousness conveyed by Indonesia's establishment of 
a "national committee" demonstrated the government's attentiveness to the problem of 
H5N1. The National Committee worked as a coordinating body, mapping such things 
as the distribution of medical, epidemiological, and veterinary expertise; domestic and 
international funding resources; media reporting; and vaccine sources and availability. 
It coordinated simulation exercises to prepare government departments and hospitals 
to work together in the event H5N1 became a full-scale human pandemic. Also, it kept 
track of the relative numbers of cases in humans versus animals, identifying 
unaddressed issues in each sector. These preparedness practices were intended to protect 
Indonesia from harm, but also, in effect, to stop the problem "there" (in Indonesia) 
before it could get "here" (to donor countries).
In the rest of this paper, I will proceed in the manner illustrated above. That is, I 
will use the tools of an anthropology of reason to examine the balance of sovereignty, 
surveillance, and optimization in the work of a series of organizational actors—the US 
Naval Medical Research Unit II (NAMRU-2), the Indonesian Ministry of Health 
(MoH), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the 
Indonesian Ornithologist's Union (IdOU, Perhimpunan Ornotolog Indonesia)—that 
were pulled in and responded to the problematic situation of the H5N1 influenza virus 
outbreak in Indonesia in the middle of the decade, 2000-10.20 By comparing institutions
19 According to the World Bank, "Avian and Human Influenza Facility," "All countries, regardless of their 
level of risk, need to prepare integrated country action plans for human and animal health as well as for 
other sectors engaged in the response for avian and human influenza. Country action plans should 
identify clear and common objectives across sectors, with associated results, outcomes and costs, to which 
all sectors can contribute. They may also need to provide for the development of policy, legislation, and 
related strategy work to support the interventions identified." See http: / / siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTTOPAVIFLU / Resources/ AHI.Facility.Rocio.May07.pdf
20 This research is based on two years of field and archival research in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, Indonesia 
during 2006 and 2008-10.
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and their methods and apparatuses, we will uncover and be able to study the tensions 
that arose between efforts to address health disparities and efforts to protect "First 
World" biosecurity.
Medical Humanitaiianism in a Naval Laboratory: NAMRU-2
A national preparedness plan was only one type of response that governments could 
implement when confronting the pandemic potential of H5N1; another was 
surveillance. The influenza virus, in both humans and animals, shares symptoms with 
many other diseases, and the entire cluster of these symptoms defines an "Influenza­
like Illness" (ILI). In Indonesia, the term "flu" itself is a popular way to refer to the 
common cold, and the two often aren't well distinguished, even in clinical practice. 
Moreover, once a person's illness has been identified as influenza, it is necessary to 
know what type of influenza one is dealing with—is it an ordinary seasonal variety or 
the deadly H5N1? Even within one subtype, like H5N1, there are different clades, or 
varieties of the subtype, with different attributes, such as greater or lesser virulence. If 
one is looking to identify the emergence of a pandemic, surveillance of influenza 
genotypes becomes a potential tool for understanding viral evolution on the ground.
At the start of the Indonesian outbreak in 2003, Indonesia did not have a molecular 
biology laboratory capable of identifying the composition of biological samples 
suspected to be H5N1 influenza virus. The US Naval Medical Research Unit-2, a 
medical research arm of the United States Navy, operated a regional "reference lab" for 
influenza virus testing in Indonesia. Located in Jakarta, NAMRU-2 provided support 
to the Indonesian Ministry of Health for, among other things, studies of "Influenza-like 
Illness" and case investigations, and it had maintained an ongoing program of ILI 
surveillance since 1999. NAMRU-2 had the capability to sequence the genomes of the 
H5N1 influenza virus using real-time RT-PCR (reverse transcription polymerase chain 
reaction) screening before culturing, and it was the only in-country lab with the 
capability to work up both human and animal samples to confirm or deny the presence 
of the virus.21
The study of tropical medicine has never been a highly developed research practice 
in the United States, and, consequently, American tropical medicine research has been 
supported overwhelmingly by the US Department of Defense (DOD). As Warwick 
Anderson writes, "the military legacy, of course, is not surprising: as we have seen, the 
links between the army and colonial medicine were lasting, intense, and multiform."22 23
Likewise, Nicholas King demonstrates that the interests of security and commerce are 
deeply sedimented in US public health.22 Still cognizant of the impact of military 
deaths due to influenza in WWI, the US military has played a historic role in influenza
21 Col. (Ret.) Jose L. Sanchez, "Global Influenza Surveillance Efforts" (Department of Defense Global 
Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response), Powerpoint presentation to DoD/ CDC Working Group, 
January 7, 2007.
22 Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 231.
23 Nicholas King, "Security, Disease, Commerce: Ideologies of Postcolonial Global Health," Social Studies of 
Science 32,5/6 (2002): 763-89.
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surveillance and vaccine development since WWII,24 and NAMRU-2's participation in 
influenza surveillance and tropical medicine research in Indonesia was not initiated in 
response to the H5N1 outbreak.
The NAMRU-2 facility was developed in cooperation with the Rockefeller 
Foundation as a research unit on the Island of Guam during World War II. One of a 
series of research units that covered different world regions, NAMRU-2 moved several 
times after its start in Guam, tracking Cold War developments in the so-called Pacific 
Theater. It was located in Taiwan in 1955, and in 1979 moved to Manila. In 1970, a 
detachment of the main unit opened in Jakarta to investigate infectious diseases of 
importance to both the US government and to Indonesia, and in 1990 the parent unit of 
NAMRU-2 was moved to Jakarta. Until its closure in 2010, NAMRU-2 had five 
research divisions: the parasitic diseases program; laboratory animal medicine; the 
viral diseases program; the bacterial diseases program; and the emerging diseases 
program.
NAMRU-2 describes its mission as supporting "American medical research 
interests in the Pacific Theater and advancing] US diplomacy in the region by 
studying infectious diseases of critical public health importance to the United States, 
Indonesia, and other regional partners."2" As part of the Department of Defense Global 
Emerging Infections System (DoD-GEIS, a Clinton-era initiative), NAMRU-2 is 
responsible for basic and applied research, public health surveillance, capacity 
building in the host countries (including training scientists and developing laboratory 
capabilities), and providing assistance during humanitarian emergencies at the request 
of the host country.26
A typical question of interest to the NAMRU-2 biologists I spoke with in Jakarta is 
this: Why does resistance to anti-malaria drugs develop in Southeast Asia and not, say, 
in Africa, where there is more malaria? Or in other words, how is it that less malaria 
can translate into more resistance?27 Before H5N1, NAMRU-2's research focused not on 
epidemics, but on what, as Foucault writes,
... might broadly be called "endemics," or in other words, the form, nature, 
extension, duration, and intensity of the illness prevalent in a population. These 
were illnesses that were difficult to eradicate and that were not regarded as 
epidemics that caused more frequent deaths, but as permanent factors which—
24 National Academy of Sciences Review Committee for the Assessment of DoD-GEIS Influenza 
Surveillance and Response Programs (NAS), Review o f  the DoD-GEIS Programs: Strengthening Influenza 
Surveillance and Response (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007).
25 See http:/ / www.geis.fhp.osd.mil/GEIS/Training/NAMRU-2asp.asp, last accessed December, 2008.
26 NAS, Review ofDoD-Geis Programs, p. 49.
27 One possible answer looks like this: In Africa, everyone carries some malaria load due to the high 
prevalence of the disease. For this reason, malaria often doesn't create severe symptoms—small boys with 
high parasite loads can still run around playing soccer. Therefore, people don't get treated and, 
consequently, they don't get the kind of erratic treatment that produces drug-resistant strains of malaria.
In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, there is a lower incidence rate. People who are infected feel sick, they 
get treated, and treatment is partial, and with poor quality medicines. This is how less malaria can 
translate into more, and more virulent, drug-resistant forms. But this is only a hypothesis, not the simple 
historical answer. The historical answer would be that quinine was put in table salt in Thailand, provoking 
the development of resistance there first. New drugs were then introduced to Southeast Asia, so resistance 
developed throughout the region. But the simple historical answer does not explain all the permutations 
of resistance in Southeast Asia.
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and that is how they were dealt with—sapped the population's strength, 
shortened the working week, wasted energy, and cost money, both because they 
led to a fall in production and because treating them was expensive. In a word, 
illness as phenomena affecting population.28 29
It is, obviously, reasonable to assume that there is self interest involved on the part 
of the United States in its research facilities, and the "population" whose strength was 
sapped and workweek shortened, who most concerned the military medical staff, was 
made up of US troops and, to a lesser extent, the diplomatic and expatriate corps. 
Militaries represent the apparatus of force relations par excellence, yet in this case the 
US military did not simply engage in an extension of force (the apparatus of 
sovereignty). Instead, by making itself responsible to the needs of the Indonesian 
healthcare community and offering emergency assistance to Indonesia, NAMRU-2 
increasingly, in the years leading up to the H5N1 outbreak, adopted a rationality 
Redfield describes as "medical humanitarianism":
For the humanitarian actor, the problem of securing populations and vital 
infrastructure is not primarily a matter of self interest or defensive strategy. 
Rather, it involves a concern for others, even very distant others, and their 
continuing welfare.24
Redfield identifies how Doctors Without Borders, an NGO that intervenes in 
humanitarian crises, borrowed from military logistics to form a rapidly deployable 
"humanitarian kit" with easily accessible and interchangeable parts, to be deployed for 
humanitarian relief. In emphasizing "joint activities [that] include both collaborative 
research on diseases of public health significance and disaster relief in the wake of the 
2004 Sumatra tsunami and the 2005 Central Java earthquake," NAMRU-2 had, by the 
decade of 2000-10, borrowed the rationality of "humanitarianism" from the genre of 
Doctors Without Borders.30
Then, in 2006, the US Congress granted US$39 million to DoD-GEIS for the 
purpose of increasing and upgrading worldwide influenza surveillance, improving 
international (including host country) laboratory capacity, and establishing networks 
of participating labs.31 By 2006-07, two-thirds of the NAMRU-2 budget had been 
redirected towards influenza surveillance, and even the improved laboratory capacity 
was consumed by a series of research projects related to the problems posed by 
H5N1.32 This work built on the ILI surveys begun in 1999 with support from the CDC, 
USAID, and DoD-GEIS. The supplemental funding was used to expand surveillance to
28 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended (New York, NY: Picador, 2003), pp. 243—44.
29 Peter Redfield, "Vital Mobility and the Humanitarian Kit," in Biosecurity Interventions, pp. 147-71.
30 See www.med.navy.mil/sites/nmrc/Pages/namru_2.htm (accessed February 9, 2010). Military 
humanitarianism is, of course, at once an oxymoron, an ideology, and part of a larger political strategy, 
and unconvincing at many levels. At the same time, to understand precisely what was going on within 
NAMRU-2, it is important to observe the public rationality employed, which was also the subjective mode 
of rationality of many actors involved.
31 NAS, Review o f DoD-Geis Programs, p. 49.
32 The site visit team was told that single-year funds received at the end of a fiscal year are very difficult to 
use effectively. For example, a large portion of the fiscal year 2007 salaries for scientific personnel were 
supposed to be funded by DoD-GEIS, but by early fiscal year 2007 no (or limited) DoD-GEIS funding had 
been received. This indicates NAMRU-2 itself was struggling to absorb the "surge" in influenza funding.
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incorporate the tracking of influenza cases in migratory birds, the passive surveillance 
of Indonesian citizens afflicted with ILI alone, or with diarrhea, and improved tracking 
of human influenza cases in Laos and Cambodia. It was also used to purchase new 
equipment and reagents, and to train Indonesian government scientists at the 
University of Iowa, among other places. Multiplex RT-PCR analysis, a screening 
process in which more than twenty individual pathogens could be identified 
simultaneously (thereby making it possible to identify the co-occurrence of pathogens), 
was costing US$5,262 a day, or one million dollars per year, at the rate of one screen 
each day.33
A new technical question, driven by global health concerns, then emerged: how 
could Indonesia, using both NAMRU-2 and MoH facilities, "scale up" this screening 
should a pandemic occur? How many samples could be run in a day? Let us return for 
a moment to the idea of a problematization as an event that creates uncertainty and 
induces changes in our ways of understanding, acting, and relating, and consider, in 
this context, a report by the National Academy of Sciences on the DoD-GEIS program. 
This report describes one institutional effect of the increase in funding for, and 
emphasis on, screening and surveillance at NAMRU-2:
Over the years, the overseas laboratories have expanded their roles in host 
countries and in the surrounding geographic regions to include training activities 
and collaborative studies of pathogens of importance to the general public, but 
taking on a surveillance role, such as the AI/PI surveillance program, has been a 
significant departure from the historical research orientation.34
Influenza surveillance had turned NAMRU-2's highly educated MDs and PhDs into 
technicians and statisticians responsible for overseeing the production of data on the 
status of the outbreak. This data took the form of genetic code developed out of a 
technical capacity to screen, rather than involving analyses grounded in 
epidemiological hypotheses based on life sciences research. One could imagine this 
transition would not be entirely well received by the doctors and scientists involved, 
and I had the clear impression that a few of the staff believed their medical mission 
had been hijacked by a US administration "gone crazy" with concerns for biosecurity 
after September 11, 2001.35
As noted above, while a military facility would seem naturally to operate through 
the mechanism of "sovereignty," what the H5N1 event effected was a shift in the 
political apparatus from "discipline" to "optimization." Whereas staff involved in 
malaria research sought to discover how the behaviors of individual Southeast Asians, 
and aspects of their history, might facilitate the evolution of drug-resistant microbes,
33 NAS, Review of DoD-Geis Programs, p. 87.
34 Ibid., p. 30.
35 One reviewer observed that this would mean the scientists were wearing their "scientist hat" more often 
than their "military hat." In my interviews at NAMRU-2,1 became convinced this was, in fact, the case.
For one thing, the scientists I spoke with each had a depth of biological and medical knowledge that could 
engage any one person full ti me in terms of training and practice. None of these people needed to develop 
additional areas of expertise in order to keep busy. It is also clear that the US government actually wants 
to collect and use the scientific knowledge that NAMRU-2 staff are pursuing, so the self-interest at play 
here is obvious. And finally, while the US undoubtedly gathers intelligence on Indonesia, it would be 
easier simply to hire a "spy" rather than a medical doctor or PhD microbiologist to do this work. In sum, 
the military hat and the scientist hat, in this case, are the same thing.
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the effort to "scale up" influenza screening was intended to intervene at the level of the 
general population (by collecting biological samples) through constant surveillance of 
the phenomenon in question,
The mechanisms introduced by biopolitics include forecasts, statistical estimates, 
and overall measures. And their purpose is not to modify any given phenomenon 
as such, or to modify a given individual insofar as he is an individual, but, 
essentially, to intervene at the level at which these general phenomena are 
determined, to intervene at the level of their generality.36
These political formations are not those imagined by either the well-reasoned critics or 
the imaginative conspiracy theorists who are skeptical of NAMRU-2's presence in 
Indonesia. On the other hand, it is understandable that the introduction of a US 
military medical presence might not sit well with host countries, nor would the 
rationality of "medical humanitarianism" be convincing to many. I will now examine 
what the global health influenza intervention meant to some of those skeptics, 
including the head of Indonesia's own Ministry of Health.
Viral Sovereignty: The Indonesian Ministry of Health
It was November 13, 2009, and the annual Hajj pilgrimage was underway. A brief 
article discussing flu preparations for those undertaking the Hajj appeared in Kompas, 
Indonesia's most respected national newspaper, portraying the seasonal flu through a 
singular Indonesian perspective:
PT BioFarma, beginning this year, will fulfill the flu vaccine needs of Indonesian 
Hajj goers. For this Hajj season, 240,000 doses of seasonal flu vaccine have been 
distributed to all participants. The Director of PT BioFarma, Iskandar, said 
Thursday in Bandung West Java that the health of Hajj goers had to be given 
serious attention because the climate of Saudi Arabia is different than 
Indonesia's, and therefore Hajj participants are vulnerable to becoming sick with 
seasonal flu.37
Vaccines are a key technology in influenza intervention, and Indonesia's ability to 
produce, rather than import, influenza vaccine, especially for H5N1, has been an 
important symbol of Indonesian scientific independence since the beginning of the 
avian influenza crisis. PT BioFarma, the nationally owned company tasked with 
producing vaccine for routine immunizations in Indonesia, took on the new job of 
producing an annual human flu vaccine at the request of Indonesia's Minister of 
Health, Dr. Siti Fadilah Supari. The effort, a collaboration between PT Biofarma, the 
Ministry of Health, and Airlangga University's Institute of Tropical Diseases in 
Surabaya, also necessitated an international partnership with Kobe University of 
Japan.
The Kompas story explained that, while in 2008 Indonesia had to import all its 
seasonal flu vaccine, and in 2009 it imported a portion of the necessary supply, by the 
following year all vaccine for Hajj pilgrims would be "domestically" produced.
36 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 246.
37 "Indonesia to Fulfill Flu Vaccine Needs of Hajj Goers," Kompas, November 13, 2009.
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Iskandar's emphasis on independent production is indicative of the high value that 
Indonesia places on sovereignty (kedaulatan) in the scientific realm. While Director 
Iskandar emphasized that the vaccine would be independently produced (secara 
mandiri) in Indonesia, he admitted that the raw materials for the vaccine had been 
imported from Japan, and that making the vaccine involves "working together" (bekerja 
sama) with Japanese experts.
Although a portion of both materials and expertise were imported from abroad, the 
story does highlight the critical role played by the physical virus itself, which was 
under Indonesian control. Influenza virus is an RNA virus, and RNA viruses possess 
highly unstable genomes, so unstable, in fact, that different types of influenza virus are 
sometimes called "quasi-species." Flu vaccines must be recalibrated annually because 
the genome changes so rapidly that a vaccine that is effective one year will not be so 
the next. Annual flu vaccines are developed through a complex system, coordinated by 
the WHO, that facilitates the shared exchange of samples. With host country approval, 
participating labs, like NAMRU-2, send samples to participating WHO centers (in this 
case, the CDC) for confirmation and analysis. A new vaccine can be generated based 
upon an analysis of what influenza strains are circulating globally at any given time. 
Before the H5N1 event, NAMRU-2 shared viral isolates with the CDC (representing 
WHO), which then used them to make their genetic sequences public thorough 
GenBank, to recommend strains for the annual vaccine, and to make the isolates 
available to vaccine manufacturers. The advent of H5N1 changed all of this, opening 
up the sample-sharing collaborations to renewed questions, and even moral reflection.
Indonesia has never been a significant consumer of the annual flu vaccine, viewing 
seasonal influenza as an issue for countries in colder climates. Moreover, scientific 
understanding of the seasonality of influenza in tropical countries is incipient at best. 
Dr. Supari has gone so far as to claim that Indonesians are not seriously afflicted by the 
seasonal flu:
Each time we are suffering from the common influenza, it is easy to control it. We 
need only symptomatic medicine (such as Bodrex, Panadol, and so on), even the 
method we call kerokan. But among Europeans, the same influenza can be lethal, 
especially in combination with pneumonia. That is why their need of seasonal flu 
vaccine is uncompromised."38
It seems here that Indonesia's Minister of Health confused "common influenza" with 
the common cold, a mistake not usually made by a nation's top healthcare 
administrator in the middle of an influenza crisis. The idea that the influenza virus is a 
negligible problem in Indonesia is contradicted by numerous studies, including one by 
NAMRU-2 finding that 12 percent of the childhood diarrhea cases in Indonesia were 
related to the flu virus.39
Before H5N1 brought the problem of influenza to the attention of Indonesians, the 
nation's healthcare community had not focused upon the problems involved in sample 
sharing because Indonesians had not previously consumed seasonal flu vaccine. Once 
H5N1 came to the fore, however, the Ministry of Health began to view the
38 Siti Fadilah Supari, It's Time For the World to Change: Dwine Hand behind Avian Influenza (fakarta: PT 
Sulaksana Watinsa Indonesia, 2008), p. 12.
39 NAS, Review o f DoD-Geis Programs, p. 87.
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international sample-sharing process in a new, more critical, way. Were Indonesia to 
be hit with a human H5N1 epidemic, the country would be subsequently importing 
and paying for a vaccine developed from samples it had altruistically contributed to 
the global community. Not only would Indonesia earn no profit from vaccine 
production, but Indonesians might be forced to pay high prices for an H5N1 vaccine if 
a pandemic should occur. Even more problematic, the vaccine might become 
unavailable to Indonesia if supplies were consumed by comparatively wealthy 
countries in the North. Having considered these issues, which were brought to light 
through the problematic of the avian influenza, Dr. Supari made it clear that all virus 
samples would henceforth be considered the material property of Indonesia and 
would require a Material Transfer Agreement for export.
When an Australian company reverse-engineered an Indonesian strain H5N1 seed 
virus using open-source genetic code obtained from GenBank, Dr. Supari 
misunderstood this to mean that the company had obtained and illegally exported an 
actual Indonesian virus sample.40 This incident and others led the Indonesian Ministry 
of Health to withdraw from its influenza-virus sample-sharing agreements and to 
cease sharing samples or sequence data with the WHO centers collaborating in the 
annual influenza vaccine effort. Indonesia sought a new, more equitable mechanism 
that would provide benefits to developing countries as equal partners in international 
global health initiatives. Dr. Supari coined the neologism "viral sovereignty" to 
describe Indonesia's understanding that viral samples from Indonesian patients were 
national property.
While "sovereignty" is directed at/over multiplicities, it functions within 
territories—an important aspect in this case. Supari applied the juridical apparatus, 
linking Indonesian territory and microbial property, in drafting a new Ministerial 
Decree41 that demanded the institution of new international sample-sharing 
agreements that would regulate all exchange of clinical samples, biological materials, 
and transfers of genetic code. She based her claim upon Section 19 of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity concerning the "Handling of Biotechnology and Distribution of 
its Benefits." The convention's agenda had enshrined the notion that the South would 
provide genetic resources to the North based upon mutually beneficial compensation 
mechanisms. Just as US pharmaceutical and agricultural companies had resisted the 
convention's interpretations, arguing that plant chemicals and germ plasm were 
common property available to anyone, and that anyone could modify and patent these 
materials freely,42 now Indonesia raised its own objections. The WHO responded by 
taking issue with Dr. Supari's conception of "viral sovereignty," arguing that 
procedures based on such a concept would inhibit vital international influenza 
surveillance and vaccine preparation.
Dr. Supari then spearheaded an effort to close the Naval laboratory, refusing to 
renew a memorandum of understanding between the NAMRU-2 and the Ministry of 
Health. She believed that NAMRU-2 should not be sending H5N1 samples to the CDC,
40 Ibid., pp. 95-96.
41 Government of Indonesia, Peraturan Menteri Kesehatan Republic Indonesia No. 657/Menkes/Per/VIII/2009.
42 Cori Hayden, When Nature Goes Public: The Making and Unmaking o f Bioprospecting in Mexico (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 63-65.
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and questioned the idea that NAMRU-2 had substantially contributed to healthcare in 
Indonesia: "In Indonesia, foreign donations for the control of avian flu outbreak were 
coming like floods in the end of 2006. But in reality, the benefits from their practice 
were not significant."43 Dr. Supari herself framed the presence of NAMRU-2 in 
Indonesia as a further violation of Indonesian sovereignty (kedaulatan), thereby 
employing a rationality that was both identitarian and anti-imperialist.
Dr. Supari's suspicions regarding the CDC and related agencies prompted her 
intervention on behalf of global health equity. Her critical view of the global health 
complex was adopted and intensified in quite a few discussions about the problem of 
influenza in Indonesia, and, in a short time, conspiracy theories entered the discourse. 
Conspiratorial and paranoid notions circulating within Indonesian media (e.g., books, 
text messages, television programs) encompassed both the idea that strains of 
influenza had been manufactured and spread to harm Indonesia, as well as the idea 
that NAMRU-2 was, in truth, a covert agency gathering intelligence data for the United 
States. We can observe a transition from the "critical" to the "conspiratorial" in Dr. 
Supari's own language:
But, in fact, capitalism has not only made certain countries exploit the natural 
resources of the developing countries. They also exploited part of the human 
body from the powerless country. They took our blood. They took our cell. They 
took our antibody. And perhaps it would be more dangerous when in the end 
they would take our brain cell as well, to be re-engineered to create a new 
generation of slaves.44
Dr. Supari suggested that avian influenza could have been bioengineered at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory and intentionally developed to infect Indonesia.45 Her 
theory attracted many followers. Concerning the H1N1 swine flu, she claimed it was 
deliberately manufactured and released to benefit drug makers, and she forwarded the 
unusual proposition that "H1N1 survives in countries with four seasons. The type A 
H1N1 virus hopefully won't be able to sustain itself once it enters the tropical climate 
of Indonesia."46 A cottage industry of conspiratorial writings developed that mirrored 
the health minister's accusations, some blaming influenza outbreaks on Freemasons, 
others on aerial seeding of swine flu around Indonesia by the CIA.47 The authors of 
these conspiratorial claims all distanced themselves from the details of scientific 
practice, and their theories took on both nationalist and Islamist overtones. Among the 
strongest supporters of the health minister were Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, 
Prosperous Justice Party), a conservative Islamic political party, and Hizbut Takrir, an 
anti-nationalist organization that seeks the return of the Caliphate. The Non-Aligned 
Movement considered endorsing the concept of viral sovereignty and, enhancing her
43 Siti Fadilah Supari, It's Time For the World to Change, p. 30.
44 Ibid., p. 119.
45 Ibid., pp. 119-20.
46 "Swine Flu Outbreak: Swine Flu Could Be Man-Made," Straits Times, April 28, 2009.
47 Nando Baskara, NAMRU: Misi Kesehatan atau Jaringan Intelijen Amerika? (Jakarta: PT Buku Kita, 2008); 
and Wawan H. Purwanto, ‘Mencurigai' Namru-2 (Jakarta: Cipta Mandiri Bangsa, 2008). See also the 
websites: http:/ / www.muslimdaily.net/ features/5396/bukti-amerika-menyebarkan-virus-flu-babi- 
melalui-pesawat-dan-keterlibatan-namru-2, last accessed June 15, 2010; and http: / / haroqi.multiply.com/ 
journal/ item/1029, last accessed June 15, 2010.
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anti-Western credentials, Dr. Supari devoted a chapter of her book to detailing the 
support she received from Iran for Indonesia's claim of sovereignty over its own viral 
material.48
Reactions from the global health community to the concept of viral sovereignty 
were likewise varied. The Lancet49 50published the most widely noted comment in 
support of Indonesia's ethical position, though some Indonesian scientists I spoke with 
considered The Lancet's stand paternalistic because it didn't account for the many 
Indonesians who had joined in international efforts to understand and combat avian 
influenza. Like these Indonesian scientists, most Western global health experts 
criticized the concept of viral sovereignty as a logic that would endanger global health 
generally and hamper efforts to confront pandemics and improve health worldwide. 
Richard Holbrooke and Laurie Garrett, for example, wrote:
Here's a concept you've probably never heard of: "viral sovereignty." This 
extremely dangerous idea comes to us courtesy of Indonesia's minister of health, 
Siti Fadilah Supari, who asserts that deadly viruses are the sovereign property of 
individual nations—even though they cross borders and could pose a pandemic 
threat to all the peoples of the world."0
A key difference in the Foucaultian articulation of "sovereignty" vis-a-vis 
"optimization" is that while the former seeks to intervene in and transform a natural 
phenomenon (Foucault uses the example of preventing famine by forcing production 
and blocking exports), the latter seeks to understand a natural phenomena in order to 
develop self-indicated techniques specific to its government (i.e., optimizing grain 
flows and prices to ameliorate the possibility for and effects of famine). Sovereignty, 
according to Foucault, does not require an intimate understanding of natural 
processes, but rather the power of law over territory.
In the political form of viral sovereignty, its proponents evidence an indifference 
toward the natural phenomena in which they wish to intervene. Iskandar's description 
of the need for independent vaccine production demonstrated a noticeably weak 
understanding or acknowledgment of the material dimensions of viral transmission, 
for example. Rather than invoking the theory of contagion implicit in long-distance air 
travel, or the epidemiological implications of the annual international Hajj gathering in 
Mecca of 200,000 pilgrims from all over the world, the director of Indonesia's national 
vaccine producer theorized that a traveler's vulnerability to the flu would be 
influenced by the climate, observing that "the weather" is different in Saudi Arabia. In 
deploying the mechanism of sovereignty, Dr. Supari's interpretation of this complex 
situation, with its emphasis on "identity," had rendered her adherents less likely to 
study and seriously consider the biological aspects of transmission and infection.
48 Supari, It's Time for the World to Change, pp. 94-113. Following the national elections of 2010, President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono replaced Dr. Supari as minister of health with Dr. Endang Rahayu 
Sedyaningsih. Dr. Supari promptly accused the new health minister of having illegally exported viral 
samples from Indonesia in the past, causing the new minister to be suspected of being an American 
sympathizer.
49 "Global Solidarity Needed in Preparing for Pandemic Influenza," The Lancet 369, February 17, 2007.
50 Holbrooke and Garrett, "'Sovereignty' that Risks Global Health," p. B7.
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Healthy Poultry, Healthy People, Healthy Communities: The FAO
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is a multilateral 
agency that has worked to combat transborder epizootics since it first tackled 
outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in post-WWII Europe.5' During the avian 
influenza crisis, FAO has provided technical and policy advice, laboratory equipment, 
and protective clothing, and has run public awareness and advocacy campaigns. The 
FAO works closely with both the OIE and, since the disease is a zoonosis, with the 
WHO.51 2 Rhetoric from the FAO's Avian Influenza Control Program in Indonesia began 
in the same frame as did other global health institutions concerned with H5N1:
UN officials are urging Indonesia to take more aggressive steps to contain the 
bird flu epidemic in poultry before the current human outbreak escalates and 
spreads beyond the country's borders. With avian influenza now diagnosed 
among birds in two-thirds of the country's provinces, Indonesia must begin the 
immediate culling of poultry in infected areas and revamp its campaign to 
vaccinate fowl against the virus, according to officials from the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization.53
Regarding the H5N1 scenario, FAO in Indonesia was most concerned with improving 
local government veterinary services to control Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
(HPAI) in poultry. It did not stop with veterinary medicine or a vaccination strategy, 
however; its plans dealt with human health as well. Its publicity video, Strengthening 
Veterinary Services and Empowering Communities to Control HPAI, stated, "While FAO's 
role in the global HPAI struggle can be seen mainly from the animal health 
perspective, in Indonesia, FAO's approach has been implemented in support of the 
human element [emphasis added] in this HPAI crisis."54 The FAO, whose largest donor 
for the project was USAID, developed two strategies to deal with avian influenza in the 
agriculture sector: 1) community-based avian influenza control; and 2) a public 
communications strategy. In the FAO effort, what emerged was a concern with 
"discipline" and the making of a new subjectivity that would be introduced by 
preparing Indonesian farmers to internalize certain behaviors when they encountered 
sick poultry.
The FAO AI program was designed to bring influenza surveillance out to the rural 
communities of Indonesia and to inform rural families about the dangers of avian 
influenza. In the words of one FAO staff member I spoke with, "when a chicken dies, I 
want them to think rabies, not the flu." The program for community-based avian- 
influenza control trained village avian-influenza coordinators in the techniques of 
Participatory Disease Surveillance and Response (PDSR). Coordinators learned to 
recognize H5N1 symptoms in backyard poultry and to report to Public Health Disease 
Surveillance Officers if they saw birds with these symptoms. These veterinary officers,
51 A zoonosis is an animal disease that can be transmitted to humans. An epizootic is an animal disease that 
spreads (like an epidemic in humans) across a wide area.
52 UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Enemy at the Gate: Saving Farms and People from  Bird Flu (Rome: 
Food and Agriculture Organization, 2007).
53 Sipress, "UN Urging Indonesia."
54 UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Strengthening Veterinary Services and Empowering Communities to 
Control HPAI, FAO Jakarta, DVD / video.
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in turn, were trained by FAO fieldworkers in vaccination, rapid diagnosis, quarantine, 
and culling methods.
FAO compared the "participatory" aspect of PDSR to "participatory rural 
appraisal" techniques, and it encouraged and extended disease surveillance through 
classical development technologies (i.e., the focus group, simple graphic 
representations, games, and practice exercises aimed, for the most part, at non-literate 
people). When the program worked well, the rural people it had trained were expected 
to react to poultry deaths in a particular way:
On June 16, 2008, Mr. Sunar's backyard poultry were wiped out by a silent killer. 
Alarmed, he reported the deaths to his neighborhood representative. They had 
learned that sudden death in poultry could signal an outbreak of deadly bird flu 
from a television announcement. In their sleepy neighborhood outside Medan, 
North Sumatra—Indonesia's third largest city—they could have felt panicked 
and alone. Instead, they stayed calm because the TV message had also taught 
them what to do: report the suspected outbreak to local authorities.55 56
In my discussions with farmers around the Javanese countryside, I found a wide 
variety of reactions to the problem of avian influenza, none of which involved either 
panic or reports to authorities, although I am sure there were some people who would 
have followed the FAO's ideal response plan. Nearly everyone I spoke with had heard 
of a new poultry disease, but no one said they would do anything special about it if 
their chickens began to die. Women, who tend to be responsible for tending chickens, 
were usually more aware of die-offs than were men. Those who expressed a reluctance 
to restock after a number of chickens had died attributed their decision to fear of losing 
one's investment rather than fear of disease. I only encountered the fear of avian 
influenza in my own urban neighborhood in Yogyakarta, where people slaughtered 
their chickens once the outbreak was publicized.
The FAO AI program collaborated with the Indonesian Red Cross and 
Muhammadiyah (Indonesia's second largest Islamic organization) to gain access to 
existing social networks at the village level. FAO was also interested in administrative 
networks at the local government level. Local government has been viewed as 
especially important in the wake of post-Suharto-era decentralization (called otonomi 
daerah) in Indonesia, a national political reform that dispersed central government 
responsibilities, including responsibilities for animal health, to regional and local 
governments.55 Often decentralization has meant that public veterinary programs have 
lost funding. FAO took on the role of coordination between the central government 
and Indonesia's highly decentralized local government system.57
The territorial strategy of the program at first encompassed the entire Indonesian 
archipelago. The goal was to prepare village coordinators across all of Indonesia in 
order to eradicate, or at least diminish, the disease in the countryside nationwide. 
When this program was at its height in 2007-08, 2,150 officers in 324 districts had been 
trained in PDSR. Later, it became clear that this wide territorial strategy was both
55 US Agency for International Development, Success Story: Community Spurred to Action by Mass Media 
Campaign (Washington, DC: USAID, 2008).
56 FAO, Strengthening Veterinary Services.
57 Ibid.
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overreaching and perhaps unnecessary, and the program shrank to cover only the 
most seriously affected areas of Java and Sumatra. FAO was explicit that PDSR was not 
a temporary fix attuned only to avian influenza. Rather, the program would provide a 
lasting framework for responses to human and animal health threats, oriented to the 
future, that moved beyond treatment of H5N1 to establish a sustainable surveillance 
system for other emerging zoonotic diseases.
Of all the influenza interventions explored in this article, the FAO intervention is 
the only one that was centrally concerned with human subjectivity:
From community radio shows, to preparing local government officials to deal 
with the media, to meeting with farmers in focus group discussions, to 
promoting HPAI awareness in local communities, understanding and addressing 
the human perspective is essential and is the foundation of a vision of healthy 
poultry, healthy people, healthy communities.58 59
The PDSR program explicitly disavowed that it worked through an apparatus of 
sovereignty, repeatedly stating that the FAO had become active in Indonesia in 
response to a request from the Indonesian government. While the juridical principle 
that enabled the FAO to become involved was egalitarian, PDSR remained a 
disciplinary form: bodies were individuated, given tasks and duties, and combined to 
create a mass capable of conducting disease surveillance and responding to it in a 
prescribed way. Foucault describes these acts of discipline and their relationship to 
egalitarian juridical forms this way:
The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were 
egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, everyday, physical 
mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non­
egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines. u
When Dr. Supari speculated that the international community would "take our brain 
cells as well, to be re-engineered to create a new generation of slaves," although she 
overstated her case, the micropractices of sustainable surveillance proposed by the 
FAO more closely resembled her imagined scenarios than did the laboratory work of 
NAMRU-2. In fact, the physical habits and attitudes instilled by the FAO's PDSR 
program are reminiscent of the disciplinary and developmentalist practices of the 
Suharto era. Perhaps because these practices seemed already so familiar, the work of 
the FAO did not attract the same field of critics or the same accusations of violated 
sovereignty that sample testing and sharing had aroused.
Careful Scientific Conduct: The Indonesian Ornithologists' Union
Java is the site of a great many human-avian interactions that do not involve 
raising poultry. According to a local articulation of "Javanese Culture" that I have 
heard in Central Java, there are five things that every Javanese man needs: a kris
58 Ibid.
59 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York, NY: Random House, 1975), p. 
222.
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(curiga), a home (wisma), a wife (wanita), a horse carriage (turanga), and a bird (kukila).60 
Not only do many Javanese households keep ornamental birds, but Java is also home 
to numbers of resident and migratory wild birds. Migratory birds stop in the 
Indonesian archipelago on passages between the northern and southern hemispheres, 
and Indonesia sits on the East Asian-Australasian, East Asian, and Central Asian 
flyways.61 So, when H5N1 broke out in Indonesia, the ramifications extended beyond 
agriculture into quite a few other regimes of identity and nature.
Enter the Indonesian Ornithologists' Union (IdOU), an Indonesian scientific NGO 
with an international membership set up by Indonesian ornithologists in 2004 to 
advance the scientific practice of ornithology in Indonesia. Funding for IdOU has come 
from the Gibbon Foundation, NAMRU-2, and the Oriental Bird Club of the United 
Kingdom.62 IdOU publishes the journal Kukila, which documents recent scientific and 
taxonomic findings on the bird life of Indonesia. "For the coming 2006-2010, all 
possibly executed projects by IdOU will also be using these ad hoc basis and 
opportunistic approach [sic]," it says in its organizational statement, and 
"'Opportunistic' means that projects will always see resources available at IdOU 
[sic]."63 In 2006, an opportunity opened up for IdOU to lead a study of wild bird H5N1 
surveillance in partnership with NAMRU-2 and the National Institute for Health and 
Diseases (Balitbangkes), under the Indonesian Ministry of Health. The three 
institutions collaborated on a project that involved the gathering of field data, lab 
analysis, and publication, and that also brought in a regional partner, an ornithologists' 
foundation named Yayasan Kutilang Indonesia, from Yogyakarta, Central Java.
Wild birds have been suspected as a possible vector of H5N1 transmission because 
wild waterfowl are the natural reservoir of all influenzas. The IdOU study examined 
three types of birds at five sites across Java: migratory birds, resident wild birds, and 
resident captive birds. Field teams were divided into "catchers" and "samplers." 
Catchers were responsible for catching, measuring, and releasing the birds; samplers 
for obtaining cloaca (throat) swabs and blood samples. Samples were then sent to the 
labs at NAMRU-2 for RT-PCR analysis for H5N1 presence, with the understanding 
that samples must remain in Indonesia.
I once watched these sampling procedures performed on a sandpiper at Trisik 
Beach along the southern coast of Java. Three samples were taken from the bird: an 
oral and anal swab and a blood draw. A centrifuge was used to separate plasma from 
blood, and the samples were stored in a tank of liquid nitrogen. The sandpiper was 
also measured and sexed, and shortly thereafter released in the same place where it 
had been captured (there are over one hundred wild bird species in the Trisik area). At 
the beach-side lab, biosafety precautions were established to protect both birds and 
humans. These included the use of rubber gloves and masks, and antiseptic 
disinfectants. Bird capture and handling was also subject to ethical protocols to ensure
60 Translations are in Javanese (kromo inggil).
61 Arthur C. Stoops et al., "H5N1 Surveillance in Migratory Birds in Java, Indonesia," in Vector Borne and 
Zoonotic Diseases (New Rochelle, NY: Mary Ann Liebert, Inc, 2009).
62 Mochamed Indrawan, H. Lasana, Y. Mulyani, eds., Panduan Pemantauan Flu Burung Pada Burung Liar dan 
Unggas: Disertai Informasi Kesehatan Masyarakat (Bogor: Indonesian Ornithologists' Union and Yayasan 
Kutilang Indonesia, 2008).
63 Indonesian Ornithologist's Union, "Profile," unpublished, 2006.
Preparing Indonesia 167
humane treatment of the animals. The sandpiper was kept in a small plastic basket 
with a towel over it to block the light and thus keep the bird calm, and the samplers 
made sure that the each procedure in the test lasted no more than five minutes to 
prevent stress and the possible death of the bird.
Unlike the work of the FAO described above, which was premised upon the 
concept of "population," understood as communities whose abilities could be molded 
to the arts of governance—i.e., discipline—the work of IdOU had a different focus, 
which was comparable to the FAO's "population" but is not reducible to it. IdOU was 
interested in expanding scientific training in several directions. First and foremost, 
IdOU protocols were directed toward the field scientists who were implementing 
ornithological surveillance across Java. IdOU carried out field inspections and 
published a field manual,64 attending to the parameters that outlined safe research 
protocols for wild bird surveillance, with care for the health and safety of both 
researchers and birds.
IdOU's work aimed to foster capacity building and the improvement of Indonesian 
fieldwork techniques, including what the organization described as "careful scientific 
conduct." For example, the program included efforts to build capacity in scientific 
writing and publishing. Rather than being asked merely to send samples along to the 
experts, the researchers were encouraged to publish their findings on the biodiversity 
of birds at each site, or reports of their collecting methods, or even their observations of 
other species, such as bats, which might be inadvertently collected in mist nets and 
traps. Additionally, the issue of sample analysis arose, and field staff members were 
invited to visit NAMRU-2 to witness and learn about techniques of laboratory analysis. 
In addition, the group attempted to develop personal protective equipment 
appropriate to the tropics, where it is not always possible to wear protective clothes 
and masks due to the heat and rain.
IdOU's emphasis on improving scientific knowledges and techniques also 
extended to the people living around the collection sites, especially in the communities 
where wild birds were captured to be sold. The field teams were expected to model 
biosafety protocols to illustrate how a person could protect herself against H5N1 and 
other zoonotic diseases. The ornithological sampling survey was explained to people in 
the villages, and results of the analyses were disseminated. IdOU representatives 
shared the data results indicating that thus far the presence of H5N1 had not been 
found, but they also explained that the virus could spread or mutate in the future and 
described the attendant dangers that H5N1 posed to humans and poultry.
In both these initiatives—to build scientific capacity and educate the public—the 
work of IdOU was oriented toward a concept of the "public" expressed by the 
Indonesian word masyarakat. Scientists, as members of an NGO movement, are a part 
of the "civil" masyarakat (masyarakat sipil), a phrase that signifies members of the public 
consciously engaged with the public sphere (village and kampung people are 
considered simply masyarakat). In either case, for the IdOU, the masyarakat was both 
more than and less than a mass of people amenable to concerted intervention by the 
state. It was less than a "population," as understood by the FAO, in that its 
characteristics were not an object of study by IdOU, nor did the IdOU aspire to
64 Indrawan, Panduan Pemantauan Flu Burung Pada Burung Liar dan Unggas.
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enhance this group's capacities systematically through planned programming, as the 
FAO had sought to do. The masyarakat, as understood by these Indonesian 
ornithologists, was also more than a "population" because it always has the potential 
to be a force that acts against the state, especially in the current post-Suharto "reform" 
era. IdOU's knowledges could be both formal, but also subjugated, hidden and 
unrecognized, having the potential to be "disqualified" knowledges. For example, local 
veterinary authorities could prohibit IdOU staff from explaining H5N1 to the public 
because it was the government's job alone to care for the people.
Health Disparity vs. Biosecurity: Global Health in Question
When H5N1 jumped the species barrier to become a fatal human disease, and 
when Indonesia then became a center for human cases, Indonesia was brought face to 
face with internationally circulating understandings of global health that it could not, 
and to an extent would not want to, ignore. As Arjun Appadurai notes:
In the remaining countries of the world, the underdeveloped and the truly 
destitute ones, there is a double anxiety: fear of inclusion, on draconian terms, 
and fear of exclusion, for this seems like exclusion from history itself.65
On the one hand, there were Indonesians' efforts to contribute to the technoscientific 
H5N1 intervention by initiating pandemic preparedness, vaccine production, PDSR, 
and surveillance of wild birds. On the other hand, there was the suspicion that the 
terms of inclusion in the project were perhaps draconian. The intervention would take 
resources away from other health and scientific efforts, sample-sharing practices might 
not benefit Indonesia when Indonesians were suffering from influenza, and Indonesia 
would be asked to contribute too much to an effort that seemed, at times, to be most 
concerned with somewhere else.
The outbreak of H5N1 was an event that unsettled known territory for health- 
related science and care in Indonesia. The massive amount of scrutiny and the size of 
budgets mustered to confront the outbreak altered the trajectories of all institutions 
involved: the future of NAMRU-2 in Indonesia became uncertain; FAO began to 
emphasize human dimensions more acutely; IdOU imagined new scientific uses for its 
ornithological knowledge; and a new national commission was created. Many of these 
changes would last: Komnas FBPI is now attempting to become a permanent 
institution responsible for dealing with zoonoses in general; the FAO imagines its 
PDSR program to be a flexible strategy appropriate for handling other livestock 
diseases; Indonesia has instituted new material transfer agreements; and the WHO has 
changed its sample-sharing practices.
While global health, as a rubric, is programmatically attuned to the concept of 
"health disparities," some inequities in Indonesian health knowledge or care were not 
recognized as legitimate problems by those organizations that took part in the H5N1 
intervention. The most notable of these problems was the vulnerability of Indonesia to 
vaccine shortages and high prices within the established international system of 
sample sharing. The disadvantages Indonesia faced as a consumer of influenza vaccine
65 Arjun Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 35.
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were not initially apparent to major global health institutions like the WHO. The 
adjustment of NAMRU-2's research agenda from basic science to pandemic 
surveillance, which took attention away from malaria and other threats to the health of 
Southeast Asian populations, could also be viewed as adding to international 
"disparities," conceived broadly.
Inequities related to healthcare were also less apparent as disparities when they 
occurred between Indonesian actors themselves, rather than across international 
divides. For example, when government veterinary authorities refused to let IdOU 
scientists publicize their knowledge of H5N1 because it wasn't their job to do so, 
villagers were denied access to crucial means of protecting their health against a 
deadly disease. Or when Dr. Naipospos was fired from the Indonesian Department of 
Agriculture for announcing to the press the existence of H5N1 in Indonesian poultry, 
information that private agricultural firms had wanted to stifle, this created an issue 
that was not about international hegemony, yet which demonstrated unaddressed 
inequities within Indonesian institutions.
The rubric of global health, as I have argued, is also characterized by an interest in 
protecting against biological threats that cross national borders, especially those that 
seem to emerge first outside the United States or Europe and then threaten the "First 
World." H5N1 influenza was one of the first few diseases to be approached by the 
international community through the paradigm of global health. Helping to make the 
link between "Third-World" health and "First-World" security explicit, Indonesia 
came to be viewed as a risk to global biological security, and pressures (both carrots 
and sticks) were brought to bear on Indonesia to encourage it to cooperate in the 
international preparedness effort. A flood of funding rewarded those who could take 
up the banner of pandemic preparedness and who could position Indonesia as an 
ethical and attentive global actor in the potential (and actual) outbreak scenario. 
Likewise, Indonesia's position within the international community suffered when it 
took a stand defending "viral sovereignty."
In studying H5N1 in Indonesia as a problematization that created uncertainty and 
induced changes in the ways of understanding, acting, relating, and operating within 
the milieu of global health, we can see that different perspectives and solutions 
coexisted simultaneously in reaction to the twin challenges of "funding" and 
"attentiveness" in Indonesia. Viewing global health as a milieu, but not as a structure 
or a discourse, has provided a chance to examine these differences in detail. While the 
scope of truth and falsity was not unlimited, it was wide, and most importantly, it was 
not delimited simply by national identity. What we can take away from Indonesia's 
experience with H5N1 in light of the differences among institutional actors and their 
different responses to the problem of H5N1 is that any problem domain will exhibit 
divergent possibilities and solutions.
Studying the interplay of sovereignty, surveillance, and optimization that took 
place as the international healthcare community sought to intervene in Indonesia 
following the outbreak of H5N1 puts into relief the struggle between the ongoing 
conditions of care in Indonesia versus the forces seeking to protect the international 
community from pandemic influenza. Rather than view the intervention as shaped by 
a particular normative rationality, I have examined shifts in rationality that resulted 
from the preparedness intervention and were particular to each institution involved.
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As NAMRU-2 developed a response to H5N1, it's rationality shifted from optimization 
to surveillance. As the Ministry of Health argued for viral sovereignty, it emphasized 
sovereignty at the expense of optimization. These developments illustrate why 
Foucault could argue that the mechanisms and relations of power are not historically 
progressive. Because, in this case, different institutions operated through different 
mechanisms, the overall program of intervention exhibited a common purpose but not 
a unified or unifying rationality. In the ever evolving "system of correlation" between 
the juridical, disciplinary, and security apparatuses deployed in the H5N1 
problematization, we see not "progress" in the deployment of power, but, rather, how 
the correlations were responsive to the problems delimited by their milieu, that is to 
say, by a new way to characterize the relationship of globalization to human health. 
This could make a difference to someone with the flu in Indonesia.
